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Abstract:  
This paper explores the frequency of permanent shocks in divorce rates for 16 European 
countries during the period 1930 to 2006, by examining whether the divorce rate is a 
stationary series, exhibits a unit root, or is stationary around a process subject to 
structural breaks. A clear finding from this analysis is that not all shocks have transitory 
effects on the divorce rate. Results provide evidence of both stationarity around 
occasional shocks which have permanent effects, and of a unit root, where all shocks 
have a permanent effect on the divorce rate. All of the permanent shocks are positive, and 
almost all occurred in the 1970s. Supplemental analyses indicate that most of these shocks can 
be associated with the divorce law reforms that occurred throughout Europe at that time, 
suggesting an important role of those policies in the evolution of divorce rates. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to provide evidence on the frequency of persistent shocks in divorce rates, 
defined as the annual divorces per 1000 inhabitants. We analyse three possible scenarios (see 
Perron, 2006 for a review of the literature on structural breaks). First, shocks may have 
temporary effects on divorce rates. In this scenario, the divorce rate is basically stable; after a 
shock, such as divorce law reform, short-run effects on the divorce rate would be observed, but 
in the long-run, the divorce rate should return to its equilibrium level (see, for instance, the 
effects of unilateral reforms in Wolfers, 2006, for US and in González and Viitanen, 2009, for 
Europe). This would imply that the divorce rate is stationary. In the second scenario, occasional 
shocks may cause permanent changes in the equilibrium rate itself, but most shocks would only 
cause temporary movements of the divorce rate around the equilibrium level. We should expect 
that divorce would be stationary around a process that is subject to structural breaks. The third 
scenario consists of all shocks having permanent effects on the level of divorce. The divorce 
rate would be expected to exhibit a unit root since fluctuations are not transitory. 
There is a large literature studying the effects of divorce on the socioeconomic 
outcomes of women and children. The possibility of divorce may increase female labour force 
participation, (Michael, 1985; Johnson and Skinner 1986; Peters, 1986; Parkman, 1992), but it 
can also affect the economic status of women and children (Jarvis and Jenkins, 1999; Bedard 
and Deschênes, 2005). At the same time, divorce may also have long-term negative effect on 
children (Seltzer, 1994; Amato, 2000; Gruber, 2004). These findings suggest that it is crucial to 
carefully consider the frequency of persistent shocks in divorce rates, since divorce can 
permanently impact on large segments of the population and on both economic and 
psychological well-being dimensions. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature that evaluates whether shocks have 
permanent effects on social and economic variables. Using statistical techniques developed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979), Nelson and Plosser (1982) argued that shocks have a permanent 
effect on the long-run level of most macroeconomic and financial aggregates, for example, real 
gross national product (GNP), nominal GNP, real per capita GNP, industrial production, 
employment, unemployment rate, GNP deflator, consumer prices, wages, and real wages among 
others. Some years later, Perron (1989) carried out tests of the unit-root hypothesis against the 
alternative hypothesis of trend stationarity with a break in the trend at the Great Crash of 1929, 
or at the 1973 oil-price shock. He used data from the Nelson-Plosser macroeconomic data series 
as well as a post-war quarterly real GNP series. Zivot and Andrews (1992) used the same data 
but considering an endogenous breaking point. Moreover, Ben-David and Papell (1997) 
examined the structure of post-war trade, testing for structural change in the import-GDP and 
export-GDP ratios for 48 countries. They tried to determine whether the evolution of trade 
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shares had followed a stable process during the post-war period or, alternatively, whether and 
when the process had changed. In the field of international economics, there is an extended 
literature on purchasing power parity (PPP) using unit root tests and considering structural 
changes (Papell 1997; O’Connell 1998; Murray and Papell 2002; Papell 2002). Recently, Davis 
and Weinstein (2002) examined the evolution of city growth in Japan by testing for the presence 
of a unit root while considering the Allied bombing of Japanese cities in WWII as a shock to 
relative city sizes. In the same way, Bosker et al. (2008) used unit root tests to analyze the 
evolution of the individual cities that make up the West-German city size distribution in the 
period 1925-1999. We add to this work by presenting evidence of the frequency of persistent 
shocks in divorce rates. 
In our empirical analysis, we first apply standard unit root methods to the divorce rate 
for 16 European countries from 1930 to 2006. When using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests, the null hypothesis of a unit root in divorce rate can be rejected for five of the sixteen 
countries. Thus, the unit root scenario seems to better describe the experience of the European 
countries. For eleven of sixteen countries, these results suggest that any sudden shock has 
permanent effects. For the rest of countries, there is a tendency to return to a stable value; 
fluctuations are transitory (mean reversion). 
Despite being widely used, the ADF tests suffer from an important drawback. It has 
been documented that the usual tests for a unit root are biased towards nonrejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, due to a misspecification of the deterministic trend, Perron (1989). 
Thus, stationary fluctuations with a mean that exhibit a one-time permanent change in level may 
previously being identified as a unit-root process, Perron (1990). To examine this issue, we use 
Perron and Vogelsang’s (1992) methodology for nontrending data to test for a unit root in a 
divorce rate series while allowing for a structural break in the mean level occurring at an 
unknown date. These tests provide evidence in favour of stationarity of divorce rates around a 
process that is subject to a structural break for seven of the sixteen countries. For those seven 
countries, only these one time shocks appear to have any permanent effects. 
We further explore the existence of multiple structural changes in nontrending, 
stationary time series using the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). These 
tests are applied to those countries for which the one-break unit root tests provide evidence of 
stationarity. Structural breaks are also assumed to occur at unknown dates. Our findings suggest 
that divorce rates may be characterized as being stationary around occasional shocks that have 
permanent effects. Results show that five of the countries with stationary mean have more than 
one break, while the rest of the countries have one break. Additionally, there is some clustering 
of the break dates, most of the breaks occurred during the 1970s, and of the magnitude of the 
impact of those breaks which achieves a peak in the 1970s, but is lower in previous and 
subsequent decades. 
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Finally, we present a possible explanation for the apparent shift in the mean. We relate 
it to major events that are known to have occurred and which may have caused the structural 
change in the behaviour of the divorce rate series. We focus on divorce-law reforms, since the 
date of those reforms seems to coincide with the break dates.1 There is extensive literature 
examining changes in the divorce rates that focuses on the effects of changes in divorce laws. 
However, empirical evidence has not been conclusive, given that legal reforms that occurred 
since the 1970s in Europe and in US have been found to have a variety of permanent, transitory 
or no effect on divorce rates. Jacob (1988) explains that divorce-law reforms in U.S. made no 
difference to divorce rates. Peters (1986, 1992) used cross-sectional data and found that changes 
in divorce laws do not affect marital stability, and more recently a similar finding appears in a 
study of Gray (1998). These results were rebutted first by Allen (1992), who found a causal 
relation between the law regime and divorce rates, and another rebuttal was provided by 
Friedberg (1998), who presented a state-based panel analysis. She found that divorce-law 
reforms, which occurred from the 1970s onward, accounted for about one-sixth of the rise in the 
divorce rate during the 1970s and 1980s.2 But, ultimately, the issue is not how large the effect is, 
but whether or not this effect is permanent, Smith (2002). Wolfers (2006) replicated Friedberg’s 
work with a longer panel using data from the 1950s to the 1990s. This study investigated 
whether the unilateral reforms that occurred from the 1970s in the US had permanent or 
transitory effects on divorce rate by accounting for the dynamic effects of changes in divorce 
laws. He found that the unilateral system had a transitory effect on divorce rates that lasted after 
15 years since the reform took place. Some years later, González and Viitanen (2009) extended 
Wolfers’ analysis using European data, by including the analysis of no-fault and unilateral 
reforms that occurred from the 1970s. They also found a transitory response to unilateral 
reforms that lasted between 5 and 8 years after the reform, as well as a permanent effect of no-
fault reforms on divorce rates. Based on this analysis, the reforms account for about 0.6 
divorces per 1000 inhabitants of the increase in divorce rates in Europe from 1950 to 2003. 
Our analysis is more interpretive; to determine whether a divorce law reform has had a 
permanent impact on divorce rate, we simply compare the timing of the reforms with the year in 
which a break is located using stationary series. Results show that the two dates coincide in 
most countries. Thus, we may conclude that the occasional shock may actually be a policy 
shock that had a permanent effect on the divorce rate. For those nonstationary divorce rate 
series, fluctuations that could produce a shock, such as divorce law reform, are also not 
transitory. This evidence is consistent with the literature that found an important role of divorce 
law reforms in explaining changes in divorce rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of 
the data used. Section 3 proceeds with the econometric specifications and the main results. 
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Section 4 contains a possible explanation for the shifts in divorce rate, and the final section 
offers concluding remarks about the findings. 
2. Divorce Rate 
The longitudinal data on divorce rates covers 16 European countries for the period 1930 to 
2006. The data for the divorce rate is publicly available from United Nations Demographic 
Yearbooks.3 These yearbooks contain regular data series of a comprehensive collection of 
international demographic statistics, comparable within and among themselves, prepared by the 
Statistical Office of the United Nations. We incorporate data for our sample from successive 
issues on Marriage and Divorce Statistics (1958, 1968, 1976, 1982, 1990), and from each 
Demographic Yearbook from 1990 to 2006. We have also utilized divorce rate data from 
Eurostat to complete our dataset which is also publicly available.4  
The UN Demographic Yearbooks define divorce as the final legal dissolution of 
marriage, conferring on both parties involved the right to remarry as defined by the laws of each 
country. The divorce rate is measured as the absolute number of divorces reported to have 
occurred in the time period and within contemporary geographic boundaries, per 1000 persons 
estimated to be present in the area at the mid-point of the year in question, that is, the annual 
number of divorces per 1000 mid-year population. The divorce rate does provide a simple 
measure of the level of, and changes in, divorce. However, the rates might be affected by the 
marital status structure of the populations to which they relate. Divorce rates may be low either 
because marriage rates are low, or because marriages are less likely to end in divorce. To 
examine this issue, we could have utilised total divorce rates, defined as annual number of 
divorces per 1000 married population, but this analysis would have been less reliable due to the 
scarcity of data on total divorce rate, which is only available from, at the earliest, 1950, or in 
other cases even later. Thus, we favour the use of the divorce rate with a longer series, 77 
observations available in almost all countries (see Table 1).5 That also facilitates the comparison 
with previous studies on divorce rates. 6 
Figure 1 shows the temporal evolution of the divorce rate by country. Our sample 
begins in a transitional period in the history of divorce between both World Wars characterised 
by a relative stability in divorce rates. Overall, this stable divorce rate was interrupted by an 
acceleration of divorces during and after World War II. After that, the stable decade of the 
1950s was characterised by a level of divorce rates slightly greater than that of the pre-war 
period. That was followed by the most rapid sustained growth in the divorce rate level across 
Europe in the 1970s. In subsequent decades, divorce rate stabilized. However, it is important to 
note that not all individual countries conform to the same pattern. 
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This quick glance at the divorce rate series seems to reveal the presence of at least a 
sudden change in the mean level of the series. That change occurs in the 1970s, it is so big and 
sudden compared to the variability exhibited over the rest of the sample period that we would 
expect that divorce rate would be stationary around that occasional highly persistent structural 
change. Nevertheless, this is not a conclusive analysis. In the subsequent sections, we provide 
evidence on the frequency of persistent shocks in divorce rates. 
3. Methodology and Results 
3.1. Unit Roots in Divorce 
We first test for unit roots without accounting for structural changes. Formally, consider the 
following expression: 
ttt DRDR ερα ++= −1 ,   (1) 
where tDR  is the divorce rate, α  and ρ  are parameters and tε  is the perturbation term. When 
11 <<− ρ , the divorce rate will be a stationary time series and any shock will dissipate over 
time.7 Fluctuations are transitory. However, if 1=ρ , the divorce rate will be a nonstationary 
time series, and the stochastic process modelled by equation (1) will be a random walk with 
drift (Brockwell and Davis, 1991) which is referred to as a unit root process (see Banerjee et al., 
1993; Hamilton, 1994; and Gujarati, 1995). In this case, any sudden shock would have 
permanent effects on the long-run level of the divorce rate. 
To test for the presence of unit roots, where 1=ρ , we apply Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). The ADF test for nontrending data is carried out by 
running the following regression: 
( ) tk
i
titt DRcDRDR εγα ∑
=
−− +Δ++=Δ
1
11 ,  (2) 
where 1−−=Δ ttt DRDRDR , ( )1−= ργ , and k is the number of lags added to ensure that the 
residuals, tε , are Gaussian White Noises.8 Following Ng and Perron (1995), we choose the 
optimal k using a ‘general-to-specific procedure’ based on the t-statistic. The null and 
alternative hypotheses are, respectively, 0:0 =γH , 0: <γAH . If γ  is found to be equal to 
0, then the divorce rate series follows a random walk. If, on the other hand, γ  is found to be 
significantly smaller than 0, the divorce rate is stationary around α .  
Table 2 reports a summary of the results of the individual country unit root tests. We 
find that the null hypothesis of a unit root in the divorce rate is not rejected for most of the 
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countries in the sample. In particular, for eleven of the sixteen countries, or 68.75%, unit root is 
not rejected at the 10% level. Our estimates indicate that the unit root scenario seems to better 
describe the experience of the European countries.9 However, there is another possible 
perspective for several reasons. First, we detect that a considerable number of countries, five of 
sixteen countries, that have divorce rate fluctuations that are transitory. Second, the nonrejection 
of the unit root hypothesis may be because the standard ADF tests are biased, Perron (1989). 
Therefore, it is possible that what we identified as a unit root process could be better modelled 
as a stationary process around highly permanent shocks. We revisit this issue in subsection 3.2. 
 
3.1.1. Robustness Checks: Panel Unit Root Test. 
For completeness, we also test for a unit root in a balanced panel (excluding Germany, Greece 
and Italy) and in an unbalanced panel that includes all countries. We first use the test created by 
Levin et al. (2002) on the balanced panel. The null hypothesis that all series have a unit root, 
versus the alternative of all series are stationary, is tested using the same autoregressive 
parameter. We then run a less restrictive test developed by Im et al. (2003). This also allows us 
to test the null of a unit root in all series, versus the alternative that some of the series are 
stationary, with a potentially varying autoregressive parameter. To test for unit root in an 
unbalanced panel, we use a generalization of the Pesaran’s CADF test, Pesaran (2007). It allows 
testing for unit roots in heterogenous panels with cross-section dependence. Pesaran's CADF 
eliminates the cross-dependence by augmenting the standard DF (or ADF) regressions with the 
cross section averages of lagged levels and with first-differences of the individual series. Like 
the test done by Im et al. (2003), Pesaran's CADF test is consistent under the alternative that 
only a fraction of the series is stationary. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of applying the aboved described panel unit root 
tests. Using the Levin–Lin–Chu test, we find that the null hypothesis of a unit root is not 
rejected even at the 10% level. In contrast, the Im–Pesaran–Shin test rejects the unit root null at 
the 5% level (it does not reject it at the 1% level), and Pesaran's test shows that when controlling 
for cross-sectional dependence, the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 5% level. Thus, not all 
countries conform to the same pattern, since these tests provide weaker evidence in favour of a 
unit root for all countries. The same fragility is observed when we test for unit root in an 
unbalanced panel; the null hypothesis is not rejected at the 1% level. 
3.2. Unit Roots in the Presence of a One-time Structural Break 
As mentioned above, in the presence of a structural break, the standard ADF tests are biased 
towards the nonrejection of the null hypothesis, Perron (1989). The estimator of the 
autoregressive parameter goes asymptotically to values close to 1 when the variable is generated 
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by a regime-wise stationary process in which the effect of a structural break is present. This is 
problematic since, in our finite divorce rate series, it is possible that the unit root tests are not 
able to reject the unit root null hypothesis in the presence of a structural break. In order to avoid 
this type of problem, we apply a unit root test suggested by Perron and Vogelsang (1992) which 
works correctly in a structural break framework, and is appropriate for nontrending data.10 
We estimate additive outlier (AO) models, which allows for a sudden change in mean 
(crash model). The AO model is appropriate when the change is assumed to take effect 
instantaneously which seems to be the case for divorce rate.11 This model is estimated by the 
following two expressions: 
ttt DUDR ηδμ ++=    (3) 
and 
t
k
i
ititit
k
i
it cDTB εηρηωη +Δ++= ∑∑
=
−−−
= 0
1
0
 (4) 
where tη  is the estimated residual from equation (3), TB is the break date, 1=tDTB  if 
1+= TBt , and is 0 otherwise, and 0=tDU  if TBt ≤ , and is 1 otherwise. Both equations are 
estimated in two stages by OLS for each break year 1,...,2 −+= TkTB , with T being the 
number of observations and k the  truncation lag parameter.  
The results of applying the AO-model to test for a unit root in divorce rates in the 
European countries under the null of unit root versus stationary around a possibly shifting mean 
under the alternative are also summarized in Table 2. Results do not substantially differ from 
the previous ones. At the 10% level, the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of 
a stationary divorce rate with a one-time break for 56.25% of the countries in our sample, or 
nine of sixteen countries.  
Table 3 displays the results by country. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for 
France and Germany at the 1% level, and for Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Sweden and 
United Kingdom at the 5% level. Results show that the structural breaks are all positive, which 
reflects the rise in the mean of the divorce rate among the European countries in the period 
considered. It is also observed that the timing of the breaks for those stationary series spans 
from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. 
Results suggest that not all shocks have temporary effects on divorce, even though there 
is no single scenario for all countries. Our results do provide evidence in favour of both unit 
root processes and stationary processes subject to a structural break. For stationary countries, 
most shocks cause temporary movements of the divorce rate around the equilibrium level, but 
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occasionally shocks cause permanent changes in the equilibrium rate. It is important to note that 
by permanent what should be understood is that the change is still in effect given a sample of 
data, but not that the change will last forever. For nonstationary countries, there is no tendency 
to return to a stable value, since all shocks have permanent effect on the level of divorce.  
 
3.2.1. Robustness Checks: Unit Roots in the Presence of Double Structural Break. 
The previous analysis only captures the single most significant break in each divorce rate series. 
However, since variables rarely show just one break; rather, it is common for them to exhibit 
the presence of more than one break (Clemente et al. 1998), and given that by simply plotting 
the divorce rate it is observed that the stable divorce rate may be interrupted by another change 
in the mean during the 1940s, we also attempt to determine whether divorce rate series show 
double change in the mean. 
For the nontrending case, we use the test developed by Clemente et al. (1998), who base 
their approach on Perron and Vogelsang (1992), but who allow for two breaks.12 Formally, (3) 
and (4) change to: 
tttt DUDUDR ηδδμ +++= 2211 ,   (5) 
and 
t
k
i
ititit
k
i
iit
k
i
it cDTBDTB εηρηωωη +Δ+++= ∑∑∑
=
−−−
=
−
= 0
12
0
21
0
1  (6) 
where 1=jtDU  if jTBt >  ( )2,1=j  and 0 otherwise. jtDTB  sets equal 1 if 1+= jTBt , 0 
otherwise, ( )2,1=j . 1TB  and 2TB  are the time periods when the mean is being modified. As 
Clemente et al. (1998), we suppose that TTB jj λ=  ( )2,1=j , with 10 << jλ  which implies 
that the test is not defined at the limits of the sample, and also that 12 λλ > , which eliminates 
those cases where breaks occur in consecutive periods. To test for the unit root null hypothesis, 
equation (5) is first estimated by OLS to remove the deterministic part of the variable, and then, 
it is carried out the test by searching for the minimal pseudo t-ratio for the 1=ρ  hypothesis in 
equation (6) for all the break time combinations. 
We would expect that allowing for the possibility of two endogenous break points 
would provide further evidence against the unit root hypothesis (Lumsdaine and Papell 1997; 
Ben-David et al. 2003; Maddala and Kim 2003). However, the percentage of unit root rejected 
at the 10% is lower than for the one break test, see Table 2. For ten of the sixteen countries, 
results suggest that any sudden shock has permanent effects. Table 4 reports results for each 
individual country. The structural breaks are all positive and significant. For Denmark, France, 
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Sweden and United Kingdom, results indicate that divorce may be characterized as being 
stationary around a mean which changes in the 1940s and in the 1970s. For two countries, 
Belgium and Switzerland, evidence suggests that introducing the possibility of two structural 
breaks results in the divorce rate series being identified as stationary around two breaks in the 
mean level in the 1970s and in the late 1980s. Intriguingly, in the case of Iceland, Germany and 
Netherlands, we conclude that these series are not stationary when allowing for double 
structural break, but the unit root null hypothesis can be rejected in favour of a stationary 
divorce rate with just one-time break. All in all, these findings seem to confirm that there is no a 
single scenario for all divorce rate series. 
 
3.3. Multiple Structural Changes 
Admittedly, there is no economic reason for restricting the analysis to one or two breaks. Using 
the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) enables us to test for and estimate 
multiple structural changes once stationarity has been established for the case with no trending 
regressors. Following the Bai and Perron sequential procedure, it is first estimated the linear 
regression with only a constant as regressor: 
ttt DUDR ηδμ ++=    (7) 
where tDR  is the divorce rate, the observed independent variable, TB is the break date and 
1=tDU  if TBt > , and 0 otherwise. As above, the break dates are explicitly treated as 
unknown. The method of estimation considered is that based on the least-squares principle. The 
sup-F statistic is obtained by maximizing the difference between the restricted (without DUt) 
and unrestricted sums of squared residuals over all potential break dates. When a break point is 
detected, the full sample is divided into two subsamples at the break point, and subsequently the 
test is carried out on each of the subsamples. This subdivision process continues until the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of no additional structural changes, or until the subsamples 
become too small. To determine the final breaks, we use the repartition method described in Bai 
(1997), estimating breaks one at a time.13  We allow for heterogeneity and autocorrelation in the 
residuals. The method used is Andrews (1991) automatic bandwidth with AR(1) approximation 
and the quadratic kernel. We impose a trimming of 15%, hence each segment has at least 15 
observations, and allow up to five breaks, Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
Table 5 shows the significant break dates at the 5% level from the Bai and Perron tests 
for multiple structural changes. It also reports the mean divorce rates before the first break and 
after each subsequent break. For those countries in which the one-break unit root tests provide 
evidence of stationarity, it is observed that four of the seven countries (Denmark, France, 
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Germany and, the Netherlands) have one significant break at the 5% level; one country, 
Sweden, has one break; and two countries, Iceland and United Kingdom have three breaks.  
The Netherlands and Germany are special cases since the unit root null is not rejected 
by the double-break tests, but it is rejected by the single-break tests. For the purpose of 
considering structural change, using Bai and Perron multiple structural tests, the number of 
breaks selected is only one, which coincides with the single-break test. We therefore will treat 
both Netherlands and Germany as stationary. In the case of Switzerland and Belgium, since 
these countries can be identified as stationary around two breaks, and given that the Bai and 
Perron method also determines two breaks, we will treat both countries as stationary around two 
structural breaks. Iceland will also be treated as stationary while recognizing that the unit root 
null is not rejected by the double-break tests and that there are differences in the breaks chosen. 
After repartition, the first break selected is 1945 which does not coincide with that chosen by 
the unit root tests in the presence of one structural break at 1966. Instead, it is closed to that 
determined by the unit root in the presence of double-structural break at 1943. The second break 
is not captured as the most significant break in any of the unit root tests used, but after the 
repartition procedure, the third break is chosen one year later than that detected by the unit root 
double-structural break test. 
There are several remarkable aspects of these results. For all of the countries there have 
been determined at least one significant break. This determination provides strong evidence 
against the scenario in which all shocks have temporary effects on divorce. Our findings suggest 
that divorce may be characterized as being stationary around occasional persistent shocks. 
These occasional shocks cause persistent changes in the equilibrium rate itself, although most 
shocks cause temporary movements of divorce around the equilibrium level. 
None of the sixteen significant breaks is negative, reflecting the increase in divorce in 
the period considered. Another interesting result is that most of the break dates are grouped. 
Nine of fifteen breaks are chosen during the 1970s, and three breaks occur in 1944 and 1945. 
This can be associated with major events that are known to have occurred, such as a particular 
government policy, a divorce law reform, economic crises, wars, regime shifts or other factors. 
We revisit this issue in the subsequent section. 
In a final analysis, we applied the Bai and Perron procedure to the seven countries for 
which the unit root hypothesis is not rejected in either the single-break tests or the double-break 
tests. Although the assumptions for the Bai and Perron methodology are not satisfied and we 
cannot strictly speak of a change in the mean caused by a structural change, we consider the 
results exemplary of the pattern of divorce rates in those countries. As in the previous case, all 
breaks are positive and most of them are grouped around the 1970s. None of them has a large 
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number of breaks, only one of them has three breaks, but results do not provide evidence against 
unit root for them. 
4.  Explanation of Shifts in Divorce 
Up to this point, we have focused on testing shock frequency for statistical reasons. However, 
since the previous analysis allows us to identify the times when possible structural breaks occur, 
we have valuable information for analyzing whether a structural break on a certain date can be 
associated with a particular event. In this section we present a possible explanation for the 
changes in mean apparent in the divorce rate series discussed in Section 3. 
We suggest the following story: we consider that divorce law reforms could have 
caused the structural breaks in divorce rate series. Policy shocks are considered to be major 
events that may cause structural breaks (e.g. Piehl et al., 2003, looked at the Boston Gun Project 
and Rathinam and Raja, 2008, investigated public interest litigation in India). Using similar 
methods, researchers investigates the evolution of socioeconomic variables subject to public and 
legal interventions, (e.g. Mitchell, 1993; Papell et al., 2000 tracked changes in unemployment 
and Narayan et al., 2005 investigated crime rates). 
For our story to apply, we begin by assuming that there is a stable divorce rate, and that 
the only divorces that occur are efficient divorces, Becker (1981), or those in which the total 
value of the couple when they are single is greater than the joint value of the marriage. It is then 
observed that the equilibrium level of the divorce rate moves to a new steady state at a higher 
level of divorce. How can divorce law reform produce this shift in the mean of the divorce rate? 
One possibility is that a decrease in the cost of divorce caused by a change in divorce law can 
lead to the total vale of the couple when they are single being greater than the joint value of the 
marriage. At the aggregate level, we would expect that the number of divorces, and so, the 
divorce rate, would increase to a higher level, as a consistently higher number of couples value 
the now less-expensive divorce over marriage.14 
We also extend our story to a situation where divorce is assumed to be inefficient in that 
the compensation between the members of the couple is not feasible, while centring on the 
applicability of the Coase theorem to marital breakdown. Focusing on the shift from a mutual 
consent regime to a unilateral divorce, Becker (1981) argued that this kind of divorce law 
reform may not affect the probability of marriage breakdown, because it only affects property 
rights. In Coasian terms, under mutual consent divorce, the party who wants to divorce has to 
compensate their spouse, in such a way that mutual consent gives considerable power to spouses 
who do not want a divorce. However, the change to a unilateral system transfers the right to 
divorce to the spouse most wanting a divorce. Under unilateral divorce, it is the party who 
wants to continue to be married who has to compensate the spouse who wishes to leave. 
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Therefore, when the reassignment of property rights between spouses is accompanied with 
transfers between them, we should observe a stable aggregate divorce rate. Nevertheless, the 
aggregate divorce rate will change when compensation is not possible. Previous research has 
been suggested several situations in which compensation is not possible. For example, those 
cases in which the transaction costs are quite high, the spouse who wishes to continue married 
may be unable to compensate his partner, and hence, an inefficiently high divorce rate may be 
observed under unilateral divorce, Allen (2002). Another example is the existence of children, 
because the involvement of children makes the negotiation process difficult and costly, Zelder 
(1993). 
Of course such an explanation is interpretive in nature and a more extensive analysis is 
needed to fully account for the causal relationship between divorce law reforms and divorce 
rates, (e.g. Wolfers 2006; and González and Viitanen 2009). Nonetheless, the point made is 
enough for our purpose in that it shows how it is possible to have a significant change in 
structure which can cause a shift in mean in divorce rate series. To probe this further, we simply 
compare the timing of the reforms with the year in which a break is located for stationary series 
in order to observe whether they coincide. We first briefly review divorce law reforms that were 
passed in the period under consideration throughout Europe.  
 
4.1 A Brief Review of Divorce Law Reforms 
We can distinguish two main periods of divorce law reforms during the time from 1930 to 2006. 
The first one occurred in the interwar period, and mainly consisted in added fault grounds or 
added egregious behaviours that were acceptable reasons for requesting a divorce.15 In England, 
in the year 1937, the grounds for divorce were explicitly extended beyond adultery, but the laws 
also incorporated a restriction in order to prevent hasty divorces. In 1938, there was also a 
divorce reform in Scotland, but like England, it was limited to extending fault grounds, Doroghi 
(1955). The law adopted in Germany and Austria in 1938 was more liberal, Phillips (1991). 
Divorce was permitted for fault and no-fault divorce after a period of separation. In contrast, 
two countries, France and Portugal, reformed their divorce laws to actually limit the grounds of 
divorce in 1938 and 1942, respectively, Phillips (1991). 
The second wave of reforms swept Europe from the 1970s. The timing of the main 
reforms was summarized by González and Viitanen (2009), see Table 6. Divorce laws passed to 
three different systems: no-fault, unilateral, and separation. Under no-fault laws, a couple could 
divorce for any reason, normally the “irretrievable” breakdown of the marriage or 
“irreconcilable differences”. This law did not attribute blame to either party, but mutual consent 
was usually necessary. Under the unilateral system, divorce required the consent of only one 
person, and did not specify a period of living apart; one could instigate a divorce without the 
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consent of their spouse. In the separation system, evidence that couple had lived apart for a 
specified period was needed as requisite for divorce on the request of either of spouse. Italy 
represented a special case since divorce was actually banned until 1970; in 1975, no-fault 
divorce was added to the legislation, following the trend that existed in other European 
countries. 
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing in the 1980s, 6 countries passed no-fault divorce 
laws; 10 permitted divorce when a couple had lived apart for a specified period, allowing 
unilateral divorce where separation was considered to be proof of the irretrievable breakdown of 
the marriage. An additional 2 countries allowed this ground in 1993 and another one in 2000, 
and 2 countries recognized unilateral divorce, the right to divorce at the request of either spouse. 
4.2 Structural Breaks and Divorce Law Reforms 
To explain the apparent shift in mean of the divorce rate, we focus on comparing the timing of 
divorce laws and the timing of structural breaks, which are determined by using the Bai and 
Perron test. For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 plots the divorce rates, along with their changing 
means (dotted line) and the divorce law reforms (red lines), for all sixteen countries. 
We first focus on the nine countries for which the Bai and Perron test is applicable, or 
those for which the unit root null can be rejected in favour of stationary process around 
occasional breaks. Of these nine, a total of seven, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom, have a break that is located close to the time of the 
divorce law reforms that were passed beginning in the 1970s. For five of these countries, the 
structural break is located in the year in which the divorce law was reformed or one year later. A 
structural break is determined at a point more than one year later than the legal reform in the 
Germany and Belgium series. Sweden was a special case, as the break is found two years before 
the reform although the year of the reform, 1974, is included in the confidence interval at the 
95%. 
Additionally, three of the nine countries have structural breaks located in the mid-
1940s, including Iceland, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Although these abrupt changes can be 
associated with the first wave of divorce law reforms, it is unclear whether this event caused the 
breaks, given of the interruption of the World War II.16 The rest of the breaks are not found to 
the dates of any divorce law reforms. 
Iceland and Switzerland present particular cases. The structural breaks chosen in the 
1970s for both countries cannot be associated with a divorce law reform since Iceland and 
Switzerland did not introduce new divorce laws until 1993 and 2000, respectively. This result 
suggests that there have been other factors that can be associated with the breaks located in the 
1970s. Although one can think that this does not confirm the divorce law hypothesis, we find 
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differences in the magnitude of the change. The change in the mean is greater for those 
countries that approved a divorce law reform, thus, we believe that this evidence goes in favour 
of the association between divorce law reforms and the structural breaks.  
For the remaining seven countries, as explained above, we cannot strictly speak of a 
change in the mean, but it is comforting that the structural breaks are close to the divorce law 
reforms. A single break can be associated with a reform in five of the seven countries. There are 
also two breaks that coincide with the World War II, although that found in 1940 for the Austria 
series could have been due to the divorce law reform that was introduced in 1938. As exception, 
breaks in Italy and Norway do not coincide with main reforms. However, Italy approved minor 
changes to make divorce more accessible in the 1980s and 1990s, and in both decades structural 
breaks are located in 1986 and 1999, so both features appear to be related. The case of Norway 
is similar to that of Switzerland and Iceland, whose governments approved reform laws in the 
1990s or even later. Thus, it is likely that our analysis is unable to detect breaks in these series 
due to the proximity of the end of the sample. 
We also look at the distribution of all structural breaks to analyse whether a pattern in 
the evolution of divorce rate series exists across Europe. Results indicate that the major events 
that could have caused the structural breaks in the divorce rate series do have similar effects on 
divorce rate within specific periods, but that those effects vary over time. In Figure 3, we plot 
the change in each country’s mean divorce rate after the estimation of the structural breaks 
obtained by using the Bai and Perron procedure. We observe that persistent changes have an 
inverted U-shaped; the size of the effect is lower in the 1940s, increases in the late 1960s, 
achieves a peak in the 1970s, and then decreases in the 1980s and 1990s. 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to provide evidence regarding the frequency of shocks that 
persisted in the divorce rates for sixteen European countries. In most of these countries, the 
evolution of divorce rate has sparked many worry among researchers and policy makers because 
of the high and persistent divorce rate that is observed from the 1970s, and its effects on women 
and children. A further attractive feature of our approach is that it can provide valuable 
information for determining whether a structural break on divorce rate can be associated with a 
special event. 
The clear result of this analysis is that not all shocks have transitory effects on divorce 
rate. This result is robust to a range of alternative tests that are presented. We observe that there 
is no single scenario to identify the behaviour of the divorce rate. We find evidence of 
stationarity around a process that is subject to structural breaks, only a few occasional shocks 
have permanent effects, and of unit root, all shocks have permanent effect on divorce rate. 
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These findings can be interpreted in the context of evaluating the effects of divorce laws 
on divorce rates. In the literature, evidence is not conclusive, since divorce laws have been 
found to have permanent, transitory or no effect on divorce rate. In our case, the finding that the 
highly persistent changes can be associated with the major changes in divorce laws seems to be 
consistent with research that suggests an important impact of divorce law reforms on the 
evolution of divorce rates. 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Others determinants of divorce suggested in the literature are economic growth (South, 1985), price 
stability (Nunley, 2009), unemployment (Jensen and Smith, 1990), female labour force participation 
(Allen, 1998), public transfers, tax laws and welfare reforms (Bitler et al., 2004; Tjøtta and Vaage, 2008), 
property distribution within marriage (Gray, 1998), child support enforcement (Nixon 1997; Heim 2003), 
child custody (Halla, 2009), fertility behaviour (Svarer and Verner, 2008), religiosity (Vaaler et al., 2009), 
television (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009), among others. 
2 In the area of sociology (see Nakonezny et al., 1995; and Rodgers et al., 1999) and law and economics 
literature (see Brinig and Buckley, 1998 and Ellman and Lohr, 1998), mixed results have also been found. 
They have asserted for some decades that easier divorce laws have only a small effect on the divorce rates 
with the exception of Brinig and Buckley (1998) who provides the strongest evidence to date that no-fault 
divorce laws are associated with higher divorce levels. 
3 For Italy, Spain and Ireland, divorce was banned until 1970, 1981, and 1996, respectively. We do not 
include Spain and Ireland in our analysis since we do not have enough data to implement our 
methodology and results could be less reliable.  
4 To fill in the few gaps in the divorce rate series, we impute divorce rate using the available data points, 
plus a linear, a quadratic trend, and a mid-point. Results are quite robust. 
5 Significant differences using the divorce rate or the total divorce rate would not be expected since the 
pattern of the total divorce rate is similar to that of the divorce rate from 1950. 
6 Much of recent literature uses divorces per thoushand people as the main dependent variable in their 
studies, see Friedberg (1998), Wolfers (2006) and González and Viitanen (2009). 
7 A stochastic process is said to be stationary if its mean and variance are time-independent and if the 
covariance between any two periods depends only on the lag and not on the actual time at which the 
covariance is calculated. 
8 This means that tε  has a zero mean and a constant variance that is uncorrelated with sε  for st ≠ . 
9 We also ran ADF tests incorporating a trend and results are quite consistent. 
10 See others papers such as Banerjee, et al. (1992) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) in which the 
breakpoint selection is also endogenized. 
11 It is conceivable that shocks have very different short-run and long-run effects, which may induce a 
graduate change in the divorce rates. To tackle this and at least from a robustness perspective, we also 
estimated innovational outlier (IO) models where the structural change occurs gradually. Our results are 
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quite consistent, although some of the structural breaks are detected some years later than those 
determined by using the AO model. 
12 A similar extension is also provided by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) for the case of trending series. 
13 For the countries in which the sequential procedure found no break since the supFT(1) test is not 
significant, we use the LWZ method which is a modified Schwarz criterion proposed by  Liu et al. (1997) 
to determine the number of breaks, see Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) . For Portugal and United Kingdom, 
the number of breaks determined following the LWZ coincides with those determined using the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), Yao (1988). In the case of Greece, Italy and Switzerland, both the LWZ 
method and the supFT(l+1|l) with l≥1allow us to select for the same number of breaks, but the BIC 
criterion determines more than 2 breaks. The number of breaks selected by the LWZ does not coincide 
with those determined by the BIC and the supFT(l+1|l) in the cases of Austria (BIC and supFT(l+1|l): 3 
breaks)  and Sweden (BIC: 4 breaks and supFT(l+1|l): 0 breaks). 
14 It is important to note that this simple explanation omits other possible effects that a shift in the divorce 
law can have, such as changes in the pattern of divorce (bad matches may be dissolved earlier); 
differential selection into marriage which can change the population at risk of divorce, other changes in 
the marriage and remarriage market, such as an increase in the remarriage population, which can increase 
the population at risk of divorce and so on. 
15 Faults mostly consisted of adultery, desertion, and cruelty.  
16 Philips (1988) enumerates the main factors that could have produced the rise in the divorce rate in the 
1940s such as the weakening of marriages under wartime conditions, the increase in war marriages, the 
separation imposed by the war and wartime adultery. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Country Mean Stand. Dev. Max. Min. Period Years 
Austria  1.47 0.68 2.56 0.09 1930-2006 77 
Belgium 1.23 0.95 3.45 0.22 1930-2006 77 
Denmark  1.95 0.74 2.95 0.65 1930-2006 77 
Finland  1.51 0.83 2.89 0.31 1930-2006 77 
France 1.17 0.63 2.50 0.28 1930-2006 77 
Germany1  1.54 0.62 2.60 0.61 1947-2006 60 
Greece  0.57 0.30 1.30 0.17 1958-2006 49 
Iceland  1.22 0.64 2.18 0.24 1930-2006 77 
Italy 0.45 0.20 0.80 0.19 1971-2006 36 
Luxembourg  1.02 0.80 2.50 0.03 1930-2006 77 
Netherlands  1.17 0.74 2.36 0.33 1930-2006 77 
Norway  1.22 0.77 2.54 0.29 1930-2006 77 
Portugal  0.56 0.66 2.30 0.04 1930-2006 77 
Sweden  1.62 0.79 3.33 0.36 1930-2006 77 
Switzerland  1.35 0.64 2.91 0.67 1930-2006 77 
United Kingdom 1.51 1.15 3.08 0.08 1930-2006 77 
Source: UN Demographic Yearbooks and Eurostat. 
Note: 1Germany includes the German Democratic Republic 
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Table 2. Results of unit root tests on divorce rates 
A: Country specific tests  % Unit root rejected 
Significance level   Trend stationarity 
Trend stationarity 
with one break 
Trend stationarity 
with two breaks 
1%  0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 
5%  12.50% 43.75% 18.75% 
10%  31.25% 43.75% 37.50% 
     
B: Panel tests (p = 1)     Test-statistic (p-value)   
 Statistic Type   Balanced panel1 Unbalanced panel2   
Levin–Lin–Chu (2002)  -0.94662(0.1719)   
Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003)  -1.988 (0.023)   
Pesaran (2007)   -1.329 (0.092)  -1.861  (0.031)   
Notes: The null hypothesis is in all cases the existence of a unit root in divorce rate. 
Following the suggestion in Ng and Perron (1995) we choose the optimal number of 
lagged growth rates to be included in the regression to control for autocorrelation using 
a ‘general-to-specific procedure’ based on the t-statistic. The maximum lag length to 
start off this procedure is set at 11. The panel test statistics are the ∗t , the [ ]tW , and the 
[ ]tZ -statistic in case of the Levin–Lin–Chu, Im–Pesaran–Shin, and Pesaran test 
respectively.  
1 Excluding Germany, Greece and Italy. 
2 Including all countries. 
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Table 3. Results of unit root tests on divorce rates with one structural break test 
Country δ ( )1ˆ −ρ  Structural Break Year 
Austria  1.04865*** -0.167 1979 
Belgium 1.80242*** -0.077 1996 
Denmark  1.30622*** -0.283** 1972 
Finland  1.47677*** -0.151 1975 
France 1.17906*** -0.340*** 1978 
Germany  0.83457*** -0.333*** 1976 
Greece  0.51521*** -0.239 1996 
Iceland  1.16039*** -0.333** 1966 
Italy 0.32726*** -0.332 1993 
Luxembourg  1.55066*** -0.252 1979 
Netherlands  1.41294*** -0.328** 1974 
Norway  1.47264*** -0.173 1982 
Portugal  1.47106*** -0.134 1993 
Sweden  1.42242*** -0.287** 1969 
Switzerland  1.1428*** -0.291 1973 
United Kingdom 2.16492*** -0.287** 1973 
Notes: One-break test of Perron and Vogelsang (1992), AO model.  
Structural break year dummy variable coefficient δ:  
Significant at the *** 1% level; ** 5% level, * 10% level ( )1ˆ −ρ : H0: Unit root rejected at *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level 
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Table 4. Results of unit root tests on divorce rates, double structural break test 
Country δ1 δ2 ( )1ˆ −ρ  Year of 1st   Break Year of 2nd  Break 
Austria  1.03855*** 0.82017*** -0.495 1940 1979 
Belgium 1.14391*** 1.06912*** -0.497* 1975 1989 
Denmark  0.72623*** 1.06978*** -0.559** 1943 1972 
Finland  1.24115*** 0.59594*** -0.274 1968 1990 
France 0.35489*** 1.0849*** -0.446* 1942 1978 
Germany  0.47493*** 0.47045*** -0.349 1969 1976 
Greece  0.33292*** 0.31033*** -0.564 1981 1996 
Iceland  0.41527*** 1.03548*** -0.62 1943 1969 
Italy 0.1922*** 0.25034*** -0.648 1984 1997 
Luxembourg  1.41351*** 0.46289*** -0.308 1979 1998 
Netherlands  0.745*** 0.78332*** -0.418 1969 1977 
Norway  0.85443*** 0.81167*** -0.307 1970 1982 
Portugal  0.72414*** 0.91664*** -0.407 1978 1993 
Sweden  0.66193*** 1.16103*** -0.715*** 1946 1971 
Switzerland  0.82341*** 0.62*** -0.745*** 1973 1989 
United Kingdom 0.53848*** 1.93239*** -0.501* 1948 1973 
Notes: Two-break test of Clemente-Montañés-Reyes (1998), AO model.  
Structural break year dummy variables coefficients δi:  
Significant at: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level ( )1ˆ −ρ : H0: Unit root, rejected at: *** 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level 
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Table 5. The Multiple Break Model 
 Mean Divorce Rate Year 
Country 
Mean Divorce 
Rate Before 
Break TB1 TB2 TB3 
Austria1  0.29 1.33 2.15  
  1940 1979  
Belgium 0.52 1.69 2.83  
  1974 1991  
Denmark  1.31 2.67   
  1970   
Finland  0.80 1.99 2.62  
  1970 1987  
France 0.72 1.89   
  1976   
Germany  1.28 2.20   
  1979   
Greece1  0.39 0.68 1.03  
  1979 1994  
Iceland  0.40 0.72 0.95 1.85 
  1945 1957 1970 
Italy1 0.27 0.51 0.74  
  1986 1999  
Luxembourg  0.43 1.74 2.33  
  1976 1995  
Netherlands  0.54 1.96   
  1972   
Norway  0.37 0.72 1.65 2.29 
  1944 1973 1986 
Portugal1  0.11 0.88 1.88  
  1975 1995  
Sweden1  0.52 1.22 2.40  
  1944 1971  
Switzerland1  0.87 1.77 2.34  
  1975 1991  
United Kingdom1 0.15 0.73 2.43 2.84 
    1945 1971 1982 
 
Note: The entries in columns 3 to 5 are the mean divorce rates following the break, with 
the break date reported in italics. 
1The supFT(1) test was not significant for any of these countries, thus, the sequential 
procedure found no break. However, the BIC and LWZ select more than one break, and 
the FT(2) and FT(l + 1|l) with l ≥ 1tests were all significant, overall, suggesting a model 
with more than one break. Thus, we use the LWZ method to determine the number of 
breaks. 
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Table 6. Divorce Law Reforms from 1970 
 No-fault Unilateral, no fault 
Country Year Year (Separation Period) 
Austria  . 1978 (6) 
Belgium  . 1975 (10), 1983 (5), 2000 (2) 
Denmark . 1970 (3), 1989 (2) 
Finland  . 1988 (0) 
France  1976 1976 (6) 
Germany . 1977 (3) 
Greece  1979 1983 (4) 
Iceland  . 1993 (2) 
Italy  1975 None 
Luxembourg  . 1979 (3) 
Netherlands  1971 1971 (2) 
Norway  . 1993 (2) 
Portugal  1976 1976 (3) 
Sweden  . 1974 (0) 
Switzerland  . 2000 (4) 
United Kingdom1 1971 1971 (5) 
Source: González and Viitanen (2009).  
Notes: Column 1 shows the year when no-fault grounds for divorce were introduced 
from the 1970s. No-fault grounds for a divorce include irretrievable breakdown, 
irreconcilable differences and/or incompatibility. Column 2 shows the year when 
unilateral, or non-explicit unilateral divorce was allowed from the 1970s. Unilateral 
divorce does not require mutual consent and can be granted at the request of either 
spouse. The dates correspond to the year when a certain reform was implemented, 
which is often the year after the legislation was passed. The length of the specified 
separation period in years is in parenthesis means that unilateral divorce was not 
introduced explicitly, but was in fact possible after a certain separation period, which 
served as proof of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 
1The divorce law for Scotland post-dates that of England and Wales by five years. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Divorce Rate by country 
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Source: UN Demographic Yearbooks and Eurostat 
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Figure 2. Divorce Rates and their changing means 
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Figure 2. (continued)  
 
0
.5
1
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Italy
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Luxembourg
 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Netherlands
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Norway
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Portugal
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
3.
5
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Sweden
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Switzerland
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
D
iv
or
ce
 R
at
e
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
United Kingdom
 
 
 
 29
Figure 3. Change in the mean divorce rate (structural breaks detected) over time 
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Note: Curve fitted as cbxaxy ++= 2  
 
